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ON INFORMATION PROCESSING STRATEGIES AND PLAN CONTINUATION ERROR 
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An experiment was conducted to explore whether plan continuation errors could be explained by 
two types of perseveration behaviours: Perseveration in a wrong Representation do the Situation 
(PRS) and Perseveration in a risky Plan of Action (PPA). Effects of success-related pressure and 
flight phase on pilots performance were also examined. Six scenarios were created where 
expected or unexpected threats had to be managed. Pilots chose between three plans of actions 
corresponding to PPA, PRS and Flexibility. Results showed that the two types of perseveration 
could effectively explain plan continuation errors even though PPA characterised cruise phase 
and PRS was more frequently chosen when managing threats during the approach phase. An 
effect of success-related pressure was observed as pilots experiencing high pressure were more 
flexible than pilots experiencing low pressure.   
 
Plan continuation error or bias is an essential component of numerous aeronautical accidents. It occurs 
when pilots fail to revise an original flight plan despite emerging evidence that suggests it is no longer safe and 
that a new plan is required (Orasanu, Martin & Davison, 2001). An analysis of accidents reports revealed that 
nearly two-thirds of decision errors can be classified as plan continuation errors (NTSB, 1994). Moreover, a 
European safety study showed that between 1991 and 1996, 41.5% of fatal accidents in general aviation were 
due to perseveration on landing under degraded meteorological conditions while they only represent 4.5% of all 
accidents (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 1997). This inability to adapt to changes in the environment which 
leads to human error can also be related to a general behaviour called perseveration and defined in psychology 
as “the difficulty experienced in switching from one pattern of behaviour or method of working to another” 
(Coleman, 2001), as opposed to flexibility. This being so, perseveration may be observed in a large number of 
accidents such as a meteorologically changing context or the management of technical failures and may occur at 
any moment in the flight plan. For example, in military aviation, some accidents occurred when pilots 
persevered in applying check-lists whose items did obviously not match with the current situation. It is then 
essential to identify the underlying cognitive processes and factors that impair this decision making process.  
 
Models of aeronautical decision making describe three main processes which are: information 
perception, elaboration of a mental representation of the situation and selection of a plan of action. Plan 
continuation error may result from any of these three processes. When an important cue relative to a threat is not 
perceived or is not interpreted as a threat, the pilot representation of the situation is inaccurate, leading to an 
inadequate plan of action (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997). When it is perceived and 
properly interpreted as a threat, a plan continuation error may still occur if pilots underestimate the risk level 
associated with the continuation of their action plan and/or they overestimate their capacity to control the 
situation (Orasanu, Fisher & Davison, 2002; Goh and Wiegmann, 2001). Hence, plan continuation error could 
be explained by two types of perseveration behaviour: 1) Perseveration in a wrong Representation of the 
Situation (PRS) and 2) Perseveration in a risky Plan of Action (PPA). Moreover, many reports of accidents 
happening during the landing phase revealed that pilots made continuation plan errors even though they were 
aware early on of the deterioration of weather conditions at the destination field. Hence, plan continuation error 
can occur while changing flight conditions are expected and anticipated. This behaviour may be explained by 
the PPA type of perseveration where relevant information is perceived and well interpreted but where pilots fail 
to assess the risk level related to their plan of action. Yet, most studies dealing with plan continuation errors in 
flight simulation do not manipulate the threat expectancy factor and only refer to unexpected threats. One goal 
of our study was to verify whether these two types of perseveration could be observed in plan continuation 
errors and especially by comparing flight situations with expected vs. unexpected threats.   
 
Additionally, while most studies on aeronautical decision making were conducted with commercial 
aircrews, fewer have been realized with military aircrews (Denihan, 2007; Sicard, Taillemite, Jouve & Blin, 
2003). Yet, in this particular domain, flight situations can result in a high degree of complexity due to specific 
and sometimes hazardous missions (Prince & Salas, 1993). Flying the aircraft may become a secondary task 
compared to the mission related task (Sicard et al., 2003). In this context, organizational pressure may be very 
563
high and expressed in the form of pressure to succeed with the mission. A study by Denihan (2007) revealed 
that naval aviators acted in ways designed to foster their combat mission success over safety. Indeed, interviews 
of 11 pilots showed that cues related to reducing risk level and considered in the decision making process during 
non-combat missions were not considered during combat missions. Hence, organizational pressure may increase 
conflict between mission-related goals and safety-related goals. Yet, in a commercial flight simulation 
experiment using think-aloud protocols, external pressures represented only 4.2 percent of pilots talk (Orasanu, 
Fisher & Davison, 2002). Analysis of military pilot decision making could be of interest in determining how 
organizational pressure can have an impact on plan continuation error. The context of flight in the face of a 
threat is also an important component of plan continuation errors. An analysis of accident reports showed that 
plan continuation error is more frequent during approach and landing than during other phases of flight 
(Orasanu, Martin & Davison, 2001). Still, results from a study conducted in a simulation session where pilots 
encountered adverse weather did not support this finding (Wiegmann, Goh & O’Hare, 2002). On the contrary, 
unlike pilots who encountered adverse weather late during the flight, the majority of pilots who faced this event 
early during the flight decided to continue in accordance with their original flight plan. This result was 
explained by the authors as the need and the possibility for pilots to verify their assessment of the situation. In 
our study, we examined the impact of flight phase using various types of threats, such as deteriorating weather 
conditions, technical failure and external threat.  
 
The purpose of this study was to verify three main hypotheses. First, we hypothesized that plan 
continuation errors would be explained by two types of perseveration behaviours: Perseveration in a wrong 
Representation of the Situation (PRS) and Perseveration in a risky Plan of Actions (PPA). On one hand, we 
expected that PRS would be characterised by wrong diagnosis and PPA by accurate diagnosis. On another hand, 
we expected that when threats are expected by pilots, plan continuation error should be explained by PPA while 
when threats are unexpected, plan continuation error should be explained by PRS. Second, we expected that a 
high organizational pressure would lead to plan continuation error while low organisational pressure would lead 
to flexibility. Finally, we expected that flight phase would impact decision making processes where the 





Twenty pilots (19 men, 1 woman) from the French Air Force squadron specializing in the 
transportation of government authorities participated in the study. In flight hours, the participants’ total flight 
experience ranged from 800 to 7,000 hrs and their mean total flying experience was 3442 hrs (SD = 1433 hrs). 
They ranged in age from 28 to 38 years with a mean age of 33 years (SD = 3 years).  Participation in the study 




Participants were first asked to fill out a biographical questionnaire including information regarding 
their age and their flight experience. They were then given the experiment instructions and started the training 
session. When they felt comfortable with the use of the interface, they could start the experimental session. The 
latter was composed of three screens: 1) description of a flight situation (current coordinates of the flight) with 
contextual information (nature of the mission, flight plan, meteorological conditions, fuel level). Pilots were 
asked to build a mental representation of the situation and to click on the next stage only when they felt ready. 
They were informed that from this moment a stopwatch was started; 2) graphic interface representing the 
cockpit panel. Pilots could click on any instrument or messages they needed to be able to make a decision 
between three choices of action. Next, they had to complete a confidence level scale from 1 (no confidence in 
the decision made) to 5 (extremely confident in the decision made); 3) finally, they were asked to write down 




The experiment was conducted with a laptop using the software “E-Prime”. This software enables 
recording of all the actions made by the participants. Hence, analysis of decision making processes was possible 
with the creation of a specific graphic interface showing the front panel of a A319 cockpit (figure 1). Pilots 
clicked on a particular instrument to bring up a small information window displaying the information usually 
provided by this instrument. Additional links were displayed on the side of the panel providing information 
from Co-pilot, Air Traffic Controller and Cabin Crew. Pilots could open only one window at a time. Participants 




Figure 1. Graphic interface used in the experiment representing an A319 panel. All shaded rectangles could be 




Six scenarios were created for the study in collaboration with two pilots who were experts in human 
factors. They were designed in such a way that each flight situation was ambiguous and where the decision 
could only be made by the judgment of the pilot with no need for a check-list. Moreover, the threats illustrated 
by our scenarios had all been involved in incidents or accident databases. The six scenarios reflected three 
variables employed in this experiment. Threat Expectation (expected threat vs. unexpected threat) and Flight 
Phase (take-off, cruise, approach) were within-subject variables. Success-Related Pressure (high success-related 
pressure vs. low success-related pressure) was a between-subjects variable. For the expected threat condition, 
three of the scenarios were conceived such that a potential threat was presented in the first description of the 
flight situation whereas in the three unexpected threat scenarios no potential threat was initially presented. 
Additionally, each of these conditions occurred during either the take-off, cruise or approach phases of flight. 
Each participant responded to the six scenarios in random order. Organizational pressure was studied through 
success-related pressure which was manipulated by the nature of the mission presented at the beginning of the 
flight situation description. Pilots in the high success-related pressure condition had to convey important 
government authorities whereas pilots in the low success-related pressure condition had to convey neutral 
passengers. Flight plans were the same under both conditions. 
 
Measurement of performance 
 
Three plans of action were presented to participants as a decision choice. They could either divert the 
flight judging the situation to be much too risky, or they could continue according to the initial flight plan while 
monitoring flight parameters because of a high risk level, or finally they could continue according to the initial 
flight plan judging there was no associated risk. These 3 choices corresponded to the perseveration 
categorizations: Flexibility, PPA and PRS. For ANOVA analyses purpose, these responses were encoded into a 
numerical variable respectively as 3, 2 and 1, from the most appropriate decision to the least appropriate one. 
Information processing was analysed through 3 indicators: amount of information accessed, amount of target 
information accessed related directly to the threat and time spent reading target information as an indicator of 
the importance of the information for decision making. Finally, participants had to write down all cues that 
played a role in their decision choice and what goals they wanted to reach. These data were analysed with an a 






In order to verify if plan continuation error could be explained by two types of perseveration, we 
analysed the distribution of the nature of the decision made by participants. Results showed that plan 
continuation errors were committed on 64 of 120 or 53% of decisions and flexible decisions were taken on 56 of 
120 or 47% of decisions. On the 64 plan continuation errors, 48 were PPA or 75% and 16 were PRS or 25%, 
p(χ2) < .05. When examining the distribution of the two types of perseveration as a function of Threat 
Expectancy, results showed that when threats are expected 27 plan continuation errors on of 31 or 87% were 
explained by PPA and 4 of 31 or 13% were explained by PRS. When threats were unexpected by pilots, 21 of 33 
565
or 64% of plan continuation errors were explained by PPA and 12 of 33 or 36% of plan continuation errors were 
explained by PRS, p(χ2) < .05. The distribution between flight phases also showed a significant difference 
between take-off and cruise phases (p(χ2) = .05) and between cruise and approach phases (p(χ2) < .05). Indeed, 
when threats were managed during the cruise phase, none of the plan continuation errors was explained by a 
PRS, whereas during the take-off phase 3 of 16 or 19% were explained by PRS and during approach phase 13 of 
38 or 34% were explained by PRS. 
 
Effects of Success-Related Pressure, Threat Expectation, Flight Phase and their interactions on decision 
performance were then analyzed with ANOVAs. Performance was significantly influenced by Threat 
Expectation (F(1, 18) = 4.69, p < .05) and by Flight Phase (F(2, 36) = 55.7, p <  .001) but not significantly 
influenced by Success-Related Pressure (F(1, 18) = 2.53, p > .10). On one hand, performance was better when 
threats were expected than when they were unexpected and on the other hand, performance was better during 
take-off and cruise phases than during approach. The effect of Success-Related Pressure was observed in 
interaction with Threat Expectation (F(1, 18) = 9.12, p < .05): when threats were expected, success-related 
pressure had no significant impact on performance (F(1, 18) = 0.72, p > .10) whereas when threats were 
unexpected pilots under high success-related pressure performed better that pilots under low success-related 
pressure (F(1, 18) = 11.27, p < .05). Interaction between Success-Related Pressure and Flight Phase was not 




ANOVAs were conducted for the three independent variables on the amount of information accessed, 
the amount of target information accessed and the time spent on reading target information. A significant effect 
of Flight Phase was found on the amount of information accessed (F(2, 36) = 5.6, p < .05) where the later 
threats happened during  flight, less information was accessed: around 16 data (±1.5) were accessed during take-
off phase, around 12 data (±1.4) were accessed during the cruise phase and around 10  data (±1.3) were accessed 
during the approach phase. No significant effects were found for Success-Related Pressure, Threat Expectation 
nor for their interactions. ANOVAs conducted on the amount of target information accessed revealed no 
significant effect for any of the three variables nor for their interactions. The results of the analyses of time spent 
reading target information showed only one significant effect of the interaction between Threat Expectation and 
Flight Phase (F(2, 36) = 6.35, p < .05). During take-off and approach phases, time spent reading target 
information was not significantly different as a function of threat expectancy whereas during the cruise phase, 
pilots spent more time reading target information when threats were unexpected than when they were expected. 
Relations between indicators of information processing and the nature of the decisions were analysed using 
Spearman correlations. No significant effect was found for any information processing indicators since all 
correlations were close to 0. 
 
Decision cues, diagnosis accuracy and goals to achieve 
 
In order to identify which information was taken into account for decision making, pilots had to give a 
written account, explaining how they made their decisions and what goals they wanted to achieve. All texts were 
then classified into: decision making cues, accuracy of diagnosis and goals. Of the 120 decisions made during 
this experiment, target information was mentioned in 60 decisions (50%), while target information was not 
mentioned in the 60 others (50%). Distribution among pilots experiencing high success-related pressure and 
those experiencing low success-related pressure showed that 67% of pilots with high success-related pressure 
mentioned target information whereas only 33% of pilots with low Success-related pressure mentioned it, p(χ2) 
< .001. The link between the number of decisions where target information was mentioned with the nature of the 
decision taken showed that 71% of flexible decisions were explained with target information whereas only 33% 
of decisions leading to plan continuation errors were explained with target information, p(χ2) < .001. On the 
other hand, no significant difference was found between PPA and PRS, where 37% of PPA decisions were 
explained with target information for 19% of PRS decisions. 
 
The distribution of diagnosis accuracy with nature of decisions showed a significant difference: 78% of 
flexible decisions were associated with an accurate diagnosis and for 22% of them no diagnosis was expressed 
while only 45% of decisions leading to plan continuation errors were associated with accurate diagnosis and 
22% of them were associated with a wrong diagnosis, p(χ2) < .001. Furthermore, 50% of PPA decisions were 
associated with accurate diagnoses and 17% with wrong diagnoses while only 19% of PRS decisions were 
associated with accurate diagnoses and 50% of them were associated with wrong diagnoses, p(χ2) < .05. 
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Goals to be achieved that were mentioned by participants could be classified into 4 categories: 80% 
were about maintaining the safety level of the aircraft, 13% were about ensuring that passengers could arrive at 
their destination, 4% were about maintaining the safety level of passengers and/or aircrew, and 3% were about 
ensuring  effective organization of aircraft repair. The distribution among pilots with a high success-related 
pressure and low success-related pressure revealed a significant difference (p(χ2)=.05): 90% of goals mentioned 
by pilots with low success-related pressure were about aircraft safety levels and 5% concerned the assurance 
that passengers could arrive at destination while they represented respectively 71 % and 20% for pilots with a 




Our first hypothesis was that plan continuation error could be explained by two types of perseveration 
behaviour: PRS which describes plan continuation error as committed from a wrong representation of the 
situation and PPA which describes plan continuation error as committed from an accurate representation of the 
situation but with a risky choice of action. This hypothesis was verified since both types of perseveration were 
chosen by participants as the right plan of actions to make when faced with flight threats. Moreover, the link 
with diagnosis accuracy confirmed that a majority of PPA decisions were characterised by accurate diagnosis 
while a majority of PRS were characterised by wrong diagnosis. Yet, no difference in the amount of target 
information mentioned as decision cues was found between PPA and PRS. This may be explained by the fact 
that several participants did not mention any decision cues at all, even though it is probable that they did take 
into account some information when making their decision. Additionally, PPA decisions were chosen more 
frequently to counter flight threats than PRS. Plan continuation errors would then seem to be more frequently 
due to a difficulty with anticipating the risk associated with a plan of action than a difficulty with assessing the 
current situation. Yet, our results showed that as a function of threat expectancy, the two types of perseveration 
are distributed differently. A more important part of plan continuation errors are explained by PRS when threats 
are unexpected than when threats are expected. This confirms our categorisation of plan continuation errors, 
since PRS characterizes a wrong representation of the situation and when threats are unexpected it takes more 
cognitive resources to build an accurate representation of the situation than when threats are expected. Hence, 
the difficulty encountered by pilots when threats are expected is more about choosing a safe plan of action 
whereas when threats are unexpected the difficulty is more about finding cognitive resources in order to build a 
correct representation of the situation. 
 
Our second hypothesis was not verified since pilots with high success-related pressure chose more 
flexible decisions than plan continuation decisions and inversely for pilots with low success-related pressure. 
The effect on performance was significant when the threats to be managed were unexpected. Hence, when 
threats are anticipated pilots may have enough cognitive resources to anticipate flexible solutions whatever the 
type of pressure. On the contrary, when threats are unexpected pressure has an impact on the decision made by 
pilots. The presence of important authorities on board seemed to push pilots to privilege safety over mission 
success. This result is at the opposite of those found by Denihan (2007) where naval pilots on combat mission 
would rather foster mission success over safety. A bias in the experiment may explain this difference: because 
pilots had important passengers on board, they could have been tempted to show that this had no influence on 
their decision. Indeed, results showed that pilots with a low success-related pressure wanted to achieve more 
safety-related goals than pilots with high success-related pressure who were more concerned about ensuring that 
their passengers could arrive at destination. Yet, pilots with high success-related pressure mentioned more 
frequently target information directly linked to threats to be managed than pilots with low success-related 
pressure, which confirms that pilots with high success-related pressure may have built a better representation of 
the situation which could explain their better decision performance.  
 
Finally, our results confirmed our third hypothesis that the context of the flight, illustrated here by 
flight phase also has an impact on plan continuation errors. As expected, performance was better during take-off 
and cruise phases than when threats happened during the approach phase. In this phase, PRS was most chosen 
while during the cruise phase plan continuation errors were only explained by PPA. This result suggests that 
when pilots commit plan continuation errors during approach it could be more due to a difficulty in building an 
accurate representation of the situation than to a deliberate choice of actions. Indeed, our results showed that the 
frequency of PRS is in accordance with flight phase workload. The heavy workload of the approach phase could 
hinder pilots in building an accurate representation of the situation leading to a PRS type of plan continuation 
error. This result is also supported by the fact that it was during the approach phase that pilots accessed the least 
amount of information. This result meets those found by Muthard and Wickens (2003) who showed the effect of 
workload on plan continuation errors in the context of the use of automation. 
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In conclusion, this study confirmed that plan continuation errors can be explained by two types of 
perseveration behaviours: Perseveration on a wrong Representation of the Situation (PRS) and Perseveration on 
a risky Plan of Actions (PPA). This distinction is important to make, since recommendations concerning how to 
recover from them will focus on different aspects such as specific training in simulator for improving 
information processing or providing techniques to help pilots to better estimate risks associated with a plan of 
actions. Finally, success-related pressure illustrated here by the presence on board of important passengers 
seems to improve decision performance. Yet, further research is needed to complete theses findings and 
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